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Happy Days Sinking Into Immanence: Samuel Beckett and The Second Sex 
 




Dysfunctional, fragmented, and restricted bodies are a cornerstone of Samuel Beckett’s 
stage, a place where characters and actors alike find themselves forced to express the inexpressible, 
with notoriously diminished resources. Historically, existentialist readings of the Beckett canon 
have offered an insight into works which seem to raise essential questions regarding what it means 
to be when normative metanarratives have ceased to govern and “realist” escapism is denied. When 
it comes to discussions of phenomenological existentialism and its proponents, however, the works 
of Simone de Beauvoir often seem to be eschewed, or assimilated into those of the more famous 
Jean-Paul Sartre. This essay argues that if we revisit Beauvoir’s The Second Sex we can gain fresh 
insight into Beckett’s construction of his female characters (who, like Beauvoir, tend be 
overlooked), and a new existentialist reading of parts of his oeuvre can begin to emerge. Beauvoir, 
as well as being a figurehead of feminist theory, was a phenomenologist in her own right, and by 
using Happy Days as a case study her theories can be applied to Beckett just as readily as those of 
her male existentialist counterparts. This essay argues that in Happy Days, we are presented with 
a protagonist, Winnie, who does much to illustrate the limitations placed on the female body, which 
in this case is enclosed literally within the earth, and figuratively in its own immanence. I propose 
that Winnie presides “happily” over reduced but familiar circumstances which see her rendered 
captive not only by the demands of a relentless and punishing text, but also by a “cultural script” 
that would fix her to the spot. In her attempts to transcend herself as object, Winnie actually makes 
of herself her own "other", and demonstrates what it means, for her, to “become” a woman. 
 
Key Words: Beauvoir; Beckett; Phenomenology  
 
 
It is no secret that the writings of the male French existentialists have long been used in an 
attempt to decode the enigmatic works of Samuel Beckett, a writer whose name, and face, have 
become synonymous with Martin Esslin’s trademark reduction of existential philosophy to a 
“Theatre of the Absurd”. Albert Camus’ specter can be sensed throughout Esslin’s The Theatre of 
the Absurd (Esslin, 2001 [1961]), and Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology is reduced, in early 
Beckett scholarship, to existentialism, the tangible, once-popular face of French, post-war 
philosophy, in order to pair it off neatly with Beckett’s works, which also seem to speak of a 
despairing humanity, searching for answers in the face of the void. More recently, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology has been used to add “Beckett and the Body” to 
writings on “Beckett and [add almost any word here]”. One French philosopher, however, would 
                                                          
1 Susan Hennessy is an academic, writer, and performer, whose work explores the application of philosophical 
theory to twentieth century text and performance. Susie’s doctoral research re-examines the philosophies of some 
key French thinkers, as it places these alongside both historical and contemporary theory and criticism, in order to 
launch a new phenomenological investigation of the theatrical and literary works of Samuel Beckett. Susie is an 
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appear to be conspicuous in her absence from Beckett studies and, moreover, her absence from 
wider discussions of the existential phenomenology which she played a key role in developing, 
and that is Simone de Beauvoir, whose contribution to gender studies is most succinctly 
summarised by the newspaper headline that announced her death in April 1986: “Women, you 
owe her everything!” (Appignanesi, 2005). “Beckett and Beauvoir” is unchartered territory then; 
in fact, the only thing that currently links the two is their sharing of a biographer in Deirdre Bair, 
their contemporaneous residency in Paris, and Beauvoir’s refusal to publish the second half of 
Beckett’s short story “Suite” (which later became The End) in Les Temps modernes (see 
Knowlson, 1997, p. 406, for details). 
 As well as being a figurehead of feminist theory, Beauvoir was a phenomenologist in her 
own right, and her theories can be applied to Beckett just as readily as those of her male 
existentialist counterparts. Margaret A. Simons explains, however, that Beauvoir’s work has long 
been “overshadowed” by that of her lifelong partner, Sartre, and that “by the mid-1950s, when 
Beauvoir was beginning her memoirs, the sexist assumption that she was merely Sartre’s 
philosophical disciple was deeply embedded in the scholarly literature” (2004, p. 2). Beauvoir 
wrote The Second Sex in 1949, not long before Beckett had his first successes as a writer, and this 
work secured her place in the history of twentieth-century feminism (if not European 
phenomenology more broadly) as what Elizabeth Grosz would define an “egalitarian” feminist; 
one who assesses “the reproductive imperative as a major defining feature of femininity” (1994, 
p. 15).2 For the egalitarian feminist, the female body is that which limits a woman’s freedom and 
capacity for equality, whilst providing her with a unique viewpoint on the world and a means of 
accessing knowledge about the processes of life.3 Beckett’s bodies are the focus of much recent 
scholarly research,4 and yet the female body is still most widely read in contemporary critiques 
through male theorists such as Merleau-Ponty,5 whilst Beauvoir, who offers phenomenological 
insights born of an intimate knowledge of the female experience, is ignored. Two works of the 
1990s placed the spotlight on Beckett’s female characters, Linda Ben-Zvi’s Women in Beckett: 
Performance and Critical Perspectives (1992), and Mary Bryden’s Women in Samuel Beckett’s 
Prose and Drama (1993), although Bryden’s is not so much a sustained study of gender as it is a 
commentary (shaped by Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus) on what she 
sees as the gradual dissolution of binarized gender identities in Beckett’s work, and neither work 
makes so much as a fleeting reference to Beauvoir. Over the course of this essay, I will focus quite 
specifically on phenomenological modes of being unique to Beckett’s women; particularly as the 
aforementioned male existentialists have a tendency to write about the human experience from 
their own (male) perspectives and, broadly speaking, the history of Beckett criticism is divided 
into waves that are directed by philosophical movements dominated by men.6 I will demonstrate 
                                                          
2 Beauvoir is considered a second wave (post-suffrage) feminist. 
3 Grosz provides a succinct summary of “categories” of feminism (“Egalitarian Feminism”, “Social 
Constructionism” and “Sexual Difference”) in Volatile Bodies, pp. 15-19. 
4 Ulrika Maude’s Beckett, Technology and the Body, and Anna McMullan’s Performing Embodiment in Samuel 
Beckett’s Drama for instance. 
5 Merleau-Ponty’s theories are the focus of both of the above works. 
6 From the “first wave” existentialist/humanist studies of Theodor W. Adorno, David Hesla, Lance St. John Butler 
et. al., through the “second wave” deconstructions of the prose carried out by, amongst others, Leslie Hill, Thomas 
Trezise and Steven Connor in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to the “empirical” work of the “third wave” of Beckett 
scholars (the current interest in the Beckett archives or the “grey canon”, the Beckett Digital Manuscript Project) 
male literary theorists, and philosophies written by men (Camus, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Jacques Derrida 
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here that if we revisit Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, we can gain fresh insight into Beckett’s female 
characters, and a new “gendered” phenomenological reading of his oeuvre can begin to emerge as 
something more than a mere footnote to “Beckett Studies.” 
 In February 2014, Susannah Clapp began a review of Natalie Abrahami’s Young Vic 
production of a much-celebrated work of the Beckett canon as follows: 
 
You would have to go a long way to find a more intensely feminist play than 
Happy Days, which was first staged in 1961. It makes a woman the centre of a 
play that talks of the human condition. You can, it suggests, have a handbag and 
still speak for everyone (2014, p. 41). 
 
Whilst Clapp’s rather bold proclamation is one that is shared by those Beckett scholars who would 
agree that the great man himself condescended to allow a woman a potentially-philosophical voice 
once or twice, it seems, to me, rather more than an overexertion to begin speaking in terms that 
would hail Happy Days as a feminist play and thereby Beckett as a feminist writer. Beckett’s 
earliest prose depictions of man and woman, in particular, conform to Cartesian dualist 
perspectives which see the male occupying the luxurious sphere of the mind, whilst the female 
appears monstrously, slavishly, assimilated by biological functions. Bryden devotes a lengthy 
chapter of her work “Space Invaders: Women of the Early Fiction”, to Beckett’s unique brand of 
sexism, and Ben-Zvi’s review of the Beckett female contains such tellingly-titled articles as Susan 
Brienza’s “Clods, Whores, and Bitches: Mysogyny in Beckett’s Early Fiction.” It is well 
documented, by his early prose works and criticism of these, that Beckett held, at least at one time, 
some decidedly problematic views about women; in his earliest short prose Assumption (1929), 
for instance, a male artist, creative and cerebral, is hounded to his death by the bodily advances of 
a woman who he cannot, as prey, resist; we are left in no doubt when it comes to the author’s “fury 
against the enormous impertinence of women, their noisy intrusive curious enthusiasm, like the 
spontaneous expression of admiration bursting from American hearts before Michelangelo’s tomb 
in Santa Croce” (Beckett, 1995, p. 5). Beckett’s “first phase” of writing is characterised by its 
recourse to gendered stereotypes and a carnal eroticism that is embodied by the female, who 
plagues the male with relentless advances; Murphy’s Celia, for instance, is a prostitute who seems 
to perpetually scupper Murphy’s attempted escape into some solipsistic, psychical realm, bringing 
him into contact with lived existence and corporeal desire against his “intellectual” wishes, and 
the narrator of First Love tells of his “union” with prostitute Lulu, whose sexuality disturbs his 
solitary bench dwelling and culminates in her bodily hijacking of him (“man is . . . at the mercy of 
an erection”) through a pregnancy (“she kept plaguing me with our child, exhibiting her belly and 
breasts and saying it was due any moment”) that ultimately leads to his desertion of her (Beckett, 
2000, pp. 70, 84). 
 It is true that Happy Days strikes one as being of particular interest and significance when 
it comes to a study of Beckett’s women, as it is a play that presents us with a focal point in the 
shape of Winnie, a woman of about fifty who stands out in a body of work where the female 
protagonist has been, up until her birth, something of a rarity. It could also be proposed that whilst 
in his early work Beckett reserves rationality for his male characters, in creating the contemplative 
Winnie he begins to redress the balance. I will argue, however, that, whilst Winnie may be 
somewhat privileged in her position in the oeuvre of a playwright/author who began his literary 
endeavours with a decidedly problematic approach to feminine portraiture, she does not speak as 
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character, and these are informed and moulded by her specificity and adherence to the cultural 
script. Added to this, if we consider Winnie as a product of her time, a married woman who is 
mired in immanence and objectivity (limitations placed on the female body from the outside), who 
narrates from an historical and cultural context that are uniquely her own, we can regard her plight 
anew, and employ those landmark feminist theories that betoken her entrance to the world stage 
alongside contemporary feminist phenomenology. 
 
 
Cultural Bodies of Immanence 
 As Happy Days opens, the spectator is greeted with a stage picture that is arguably as alien 
and uncompromising now as it was at its unveiling over fifty years ago. Winnie is literally, and 
figuratively, centre stage for the duration of this two act performance and, when she is first seen, 
she is embedded “up to above her waist in exact centre” of a mound of scorched grass, with a 
“Maximum of simplicity and symmetry” (Beckett, 2006, p. 138). There is much in this first tableau 
alone that echoes Beauvoir’s description of “Woman” as, historically, “bound to her body” (1997, 
p. 97): Winnie’s body is encased in an earthly womb-tomb, tying Woman to the very land which, 
amongst early tillers of the soil, was considered her mystical domain. If Woman then, as egalitarian 
feminism suggests, is tied down or burdened by the reproductive cycle, we might render Winnie’s 
entrapment from the waist down as particularly significant, her reproductive organs acting, 
metaphorically, as the lead weights that fetter her to the “earth mother” and exclude her from 
society. It could also be suggested that the enclosure of Winnie’s lower body offers her a form of 
protection, or is a defensive structure: in her passivity, which is juxtaposed to the male’s self-
fulfilling activity, the female is, according to Beauvoir, “the victim of the species” (p. 52). Iris 
Marion Young, who writes of the embodied female experience, often referring to Beauvoir as she 
does so, reminds us that Woman lives not only the ongoing threat of being objectified by the male 
gaze, but also the threat of her body space being invaded, with rape being the most extreme 
example of such “spatial and bodily invasion” (2005, p. 45), and more subtle, daily invasions 
shaping her very body-consciousness. Young proposes that as a defensive measure against these 
invasions, women “tend to project an existential barrier closed around them” as a means of 
distancing the potentially-invasive other, adding that: “The woman lives her space as confined and 
closed around her, at least in part as projecting some small area in which she can exist as a free 
subject” (p. 45). Winnie, then, strikes one as something of a visual representation of Young’s 
confined woman, as well as Beauvoir’s conception of the female body as “a thing sunk deeply in 
its own immanence”, limited to the processes of life rather than knowing the freedom of spirit, 
forbidden the animating transcendence afforded to the male, and offering forth, for his taking, his 
possession and consumption, the “the inert and passive qualities of an object” (p. 189). Where 
man’s existence has been a projection, a striving towards creation and domination of the world 
and nature, Woman’s has historically been associated with stasis, with reliance upon, or 
enslavement to, nature, and with maintenance of a closed space, a retreat that man may return to 
in between bouts of exploration and endeavour. Winnie exists, on the one hand, as a subjective 
being, as a human being, but her mode of being Woman means that her existence, her body, is 
fated to remain closed in on itself, to become more object than subject, more immanence than 
transcendence.  
 The enclosure in immanence that marks the life of Beauvoir’s Woman and reduces her 
possibilities in the wider world, leads to her creation of a private world or personal sphere of 




Journal of International Women’s Studies  Vol. 17, No. 2  February 2016 
personality. Whilst man, for Beauvoir, is only superficially interested in his immediate 
surroundings (having outside projects through which he can change the face of the world), Woman, 
shackled to her conjugal duties in the home, must make of her domestic prison a realm in order to 
survive it. Winnie’s day begins in the same manner that all of her days begin, with the piercing 
ringing of a bell that dictates when she may sleep and when she must wake, followed by immediate 
recourse to her infamous, “capacious black bag” (Beckett, 2006, p. 138) containing the objects 
which sculpt her identity, and populate her realm. From her bag, Winnie produces toothpaste and 
brush, mirror, spectacles, medicine, lipstick, “a small ornate brimless hat with crumpled feather” 
(p. 142), a magnifying glass, a comb, a music box, a nail file, and the auspicious revolver 
“Brownie”, all of which could be seen as extensions of, or objects with which one can 
enhance/modify, the human body. The contents of Winnie’s bag allow her, despite her 
insurmountable incapacity, to find accomplishment, or happiness, in the material extension of her 
body, and her belongings are shut up, as are her prospects, “within the circle of herself” (Beauvoir, 
1997, p. 467). As Beauvoir’s Woman, like Winnie, cannot identify herself with what she does, in 
any tangible sense, she must seek self-realisation in what she has, and it is in this sense that such 
props can be elevated to a seemingly irrational level of importance, in life as on the stage.  
 During Act One the stage business is focused on Winnie’s mastery and manipulation of 
her objects, and each of these helps to foreground Winnie’s bodily existence. Grosz writes (with 
reference to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology), that the body “is defined by its relations with 
objects and in turn defines these objects as such – it is ‘sense-bestowing’ and ‘form-giving,’ 
providing a structure, organization, and ground within which objects are to be situated and against 
which the body-subject is positioned” (1994, p. 87). The actor’s body, amidst its set and properties, 
succinctly demonstrates corporeality as focal point, perspective, and conscious being’s sole means 
of engagement with a world. The body, for Merleau-Ponty, is “a central or organizing perspective” 
(Grosz, 1994, p. 90), just as it is for Sartre an “instrumental center [sic] of instrumental complexes” 
(Sartre, 2009, p. 350). However, Grosz raises a crucial point when she notes that, “while Merleau-
Ponty provides a number of crucial insights about the forms and structure of human embodiment, 
he nevertheless excludes or cannot explain those specific corporeal experiences undergone by 
women” (1994, p. 108). In order for us to empathise with Winnie, we must understand her as more 
than the universal body of physiology; she is a female, situated body, a body inscribed and 
manifested by her entire existential experience. As Beauvoir writes, engendering the theories of 
Sartre, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, a woman’s body is one of the essential elements of her 
being-in-the-world; however, “that body is not enough to define her as woman; there is no true 
living reality except as manifested by the conscious individual through activities and in the bosom 
of a society” (1997, p. 69). We must look, then, to Winnie’s activities, her objects, her micro-
society, her entire bodily situation, if we are to understand the wider implications of her immanent 
confinement; as Grosz writes: “The body is not opposed to culture, a resistant throwback to a 
natural past; it is itself a cultural; the cultural product” (1994, p. 23). Winnie’s interactions with 
objects and with her one conscious, or semi-conscious, companion, Willie, do much to convince 
us that her body is the consummate cultural product of her time.  
 
 
A Doll of Flesh 
 Like any good housewife of her era Winnie polishes, wipes, and brushes ( lenses, eyes, and 
teeth) repetitively and ritualistically, perhaps by way of sharpening her senses and thereby her 
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Beauvoir writes that in her cleaning and her preserving “The housewife wears herself out marking 
time: she makes nothing, simply perpetuates the present” (1997, p. 470). As the cornerstone of her 
“housework”, Winnie’s personal grooming rituals seek to maintain rather than to create anew, and 
she inspects her newly brushed teeth as though they are impersonal objects, only to assert that, 
orally, the prognosis is “no better, no worse” than it has been previously (Beckett, 2006, p. 139). 
Winnie’s body is part and parcel of her home and possessions, and in the absence of conventional 
bricks and mortar, she cleans, renovates and organises it according to codes of custom. Winnie 
fights against physical deterioration by denaturing herself, and her belongings, with what little 
means she has at her disposal, and each prop is a symbol of her entire, gendered, cultural 
circumstance; it is surely something more than coincidence that this female protagonist has in an 
incredibly limited arsenal, a lipstick and mirror. Beauvoir famously states that: “One is not born, 
but rather becomes, a woman” (1997, p. 295). Gender, for Beauvoir, is socially constructed, a 
learnt behaviour, unlike sex, which is biologically predestined. For Winnie, femininity is 
something that is worked at with tools that sculpt and order the flesh, and she uses her 
stereotypically-feminine props as a means of perpetually reestablishing her womanhood: her 
gendered identity. As Young would have it, Woman, used to being viewed as object and 
possession, becomes distanced from her body: “She gazes at it in the mirror, worries about how it 
looks to others, prunes it, shapes it, molds and decorates it” (2005, p. 44). An extreme example of 
today’s Woman augmenting nature and objectifying/molding her own body, and thereby gender 
would be cosmetic surgery, the insertion of silicon into the breasts, or the freezing of the face with 
Botox. Winnie captures “fleeting joys” (Beckett, 2006, p. 141) as she petrifies her physiology and 
becomes a woman in a less invasive and more familiar way; already adorned with bodice and 
pearls, she takes pride in painting her lips and donning her hat, even in her virtual isolation. 
Beauvoir observes that women’s fashions “are often devoted to cutting off the feminine body from 
activity” (1997, p. 190) by prescribing restrictive corsets and impractical embellishments which 
contain the wearer and make of nature an artifice. Society requires Woman, in her inconvenient 
attire, to become the fixed ideal of her gender, a “doll of flesh” (Beauvoir, 1997, p. 546), unless 
she wishes to stand out as nonconformist or anarchist, and there is something of the animated doll 
about Winnie, as she transfigures nature, whilst quite literally cut off from activity, to make of 
herself man’s idol.  
 The Winnie of Act Two is “embedded up to neck, hat on head” (Beckett, 2006, p. 160), 
and what little bodily autonomy she had in Act One, where she enjoyed a precarious freedom 
through manipulation of/identification with objects, has been all but eradicated. A now completely 
immobilised Winnie must labour on to the end of the play with only her face and voice as vehicles 
of expression and, as she does so, she utters a telling fragment of a story concerning a little girl, 
Mildred, who has “been given a big waxen dolly” (p. 163). Beauvoir writes at length about the 
symbolic significance of the doll as an object in which the little girl can incarnate herself. The boy, 
Beauvoir suggests, finds an alter ego, an “other” in the penis, enabling him to “boldly assume an 
attitude of subjectivity” (1997, p. 306) and take pride in this symbol of transcendence and power. 
The girl on the other hand, lacking this “natural plaything” gives her whole person to a foreign 
object, sets her whole “self” up as “other”, and identifies with the doll, “an inert given object” (p. 
306). Winnie creates and projects multiple objectified images of her femininity, as she conjures 
and presents images of Mildred and her waxwork double from within her own psyche like Russian 
doll miniatures of herself. Winnie’s premature burial could even be viewed, again, as a protective 
measure, preventing her, as it does, from experiencing the potential invasion of her lower body 
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to scream, and drop her passive playmate (p. 165). If Mildred could be taken for Winnie’s infant 
self (either literally or, perhaps, in the shape of her own child), an innocent subjected to the 
invasion of her body by the aggressive forces of nature (menstruation and sexual initiation amongst 
these), then her doll, with her “Pearly necklace” and her “China blue eyes that open and shut” (just 
as Winnie’s seemingly automated eyes open and shut, and her smile, devoid of genuine, lived 
emotion, snaps on and off in mechanical accordance with the stage directions), could be said to be 
Winnie’s ideal, incorruptible image (p. 163).  
 Winnie, it seems, objectifies herself in order to conform to abstract ideals. Ultimately, 
however, Winnie’s objectification, her “otherness”, is brought about as a direct result of her 
constant subjection to the look of the other or, more specifically, the male, patriarchal gaze of 
society, the occasional gaze of her disinterested husband and the ubiquitous gaze of god (whom 
Winnie frequently pays tribute to in Act One), the upholder of male supremacy. Winnie is also a 
mouthpiece for Beckett, a male writer, and she moves and speaks as a marionette who animates 
his preconceived notions of femininity. Bryden claims that “Where [Beckett’s] women are referred 
to in terms of objects, it is generally from their own mouths” (1993, p. 107). Whilst the above 
description of Winnie as self-made doll would seem to be in accordance with Bryden’s claim, I 
would argue that the objectification of women in Beckett’s drama is rather more complex than she 
will admit. If Woman does objectify herself it is by way of adherence to man-made values and 
societal norms that have already objectified her, and which would have her do the same, lest she 
find herself unhappily cast out of the culture. Winnie may be given use of a mind that would drift, 
gossamer-like, “into the blue” (Beckett, 2006, p. 152) but Beckett is unambiguous regarding her 
vital, womanly, statistics in his description of her as “well-preserved, blonde for preference, 
plump” with “arms and shoulders bare” and wearing a “low bodice” revealing a “big bosom” (p. 
138) which is referred to throughout. In a revelatory section of her barely-broken sixty-minute 
monologue, Winnie recalls being approached, in her shallow grave, by a Mr. Shower or Cooker, 
who declared upon witnessing Winnie’s waist-high interment: “Can’t have been a bad bosom . . . 
in its day” (p. 165). Winnie, like the women of Beckett’s early prose, is still predominantly a 
biological, sexual creature, and she is assessed by Shower/Cooker accordingly. Young writes that:  
 
In our culture that focuses to the extreme on breasts, a woman . . . often feels 
herself judged and evaluated according to the size and contours of her breasts, and 
indeed she often is (2005, p. 76).  
 
Winnie, in her immanent fixity, cannot choose but to be inspected in this impersonal fashion by 
Shower/Cooker, a representative of patriarchal society, and when her breasts are buried, their 
“disappearance” has a profound effect on her sense of self, their loss being noted, where so many, 
more obvious, losses are not (p. 161). For Shower/Cooker Winnie is little more than the possibility 
of sexual relations; he asks why Willie has not dug her out (a question we might all ask) as, to his 
mind, she is no use to her husband with her lower body buried (p. 157). Woman, in Winnie’s day, 
is “best used” as man’s counterpart, man’s servant, and perhaps Willie has not dug her out of her 
hole because it is he who has placed her there. Winnie and Willie are not equals; as Shower/Cooker 
neatly summarises it, the couple are not two sexed beings of the same species, man and woman, 
they are one subjective, autonomous being, and one object, designed for that subject’s use: they 
are, “man and – wife” (p. 157). If Winnie sees herself as object then, it is because she does not 
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renouncing her own transcendence and assuming an inert passivity, so that she may, through him, 
gain a place in society and ensure her own happiness.  
 
 
The Happiness Script 
 Beauvoir speaks of the married couple as the, “original Mitsein, a basic combination” 
adding that, “as such it always appears as a permanent or temporary element in a large collectivity” 
(1997, pp. 67-68). Marriage, then, is an institution approved and endorsed by society, and one 
which makes certain promises to both participants in the union. We may marry, for instance, in 
the belief that doing so will make us happy, and Sara Ahmed, in her recent work The Promise of 
Happiness (2010), writes about how happiness can be used to justify forms of social oppression, 
marriage sometimes being one of these. Ahmed, who takes impetus from The Second Sex, writes 
of how Beauvoir, “shows so well how happiness translates its wish into a politics, a wishful 
politics, a politics that demands others live according to a wish” (2010, p. 2). Winnie lives 
according to the wish that Willie will look at or respond to her once in a while and, in doing so, 
justify her existence; so much as one word from Willie, can lead Winnie to declare: “Oh you are 
going to talk to me today, this is going to be a happy day!” (p. 146). Small acknowledgements 
from a seldom seen husband delight Winnie and allow her to assume the role of happy, devoted 
wife more completely. Winnie remains cheerful, according to Shari Benstock, so that she might 
play out her role in the “cultural script” and “she survives as most wives and housewives survive 
– by not questioning the givens of their existence but focusing on daily necessities, coping hour-
by-hour, minute-by-minute” (1992, p. 174). Ahmed makes reference not only to Beauvoir’s 
philosophy but also to Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique which was written in 1963, just two 
years after Happy Days, and could almost be said to narrate Winnie’s plight, when Ahmed writes 
that:  
 
The happy housewife is a fantasy figure that erases the signs of labor under the 
sign of happiness. The claim that women are happy and that this happiness is 
behind the work they do functions to justify gendered forms of labor, not as a 
product of nature, law, or duty, but as an expression of a collective wish and 
desire (2010, p. 50). 
 
The ideal of the “happy housewife” could even be said to be making a return according to Ahmed, 
as new generation of bloggers instruct each other on how to assume this identity via the internet. 
Ahmed writes: “Such blogs typically include recipes, tips on doing housework, thoughts on 
mothering, as well as belief statements that register the happy housewife as an important social 
role and duty that must be defended, as if the speech act (‘I am a happy housewife’) is itself a 
rebellion against a social orthodoxy” (pp. 52-53). In Winnie, of course, we see no such signs of 
rebellion; hers is a submission to the cultural, gendered script of fifty years ago that dangles 
happiness like a carrot in front of her nose, the pursuit of which will lead her to conformity. Ahmed 
writes that “gendered scripts” can be thought of as “‘happiness scripts’ providing a set of 
instructions for what women and men must do in order to be happy” (p. 59) and that, in such 
scripts, happiness comes to those who are deemed to be “good” in the eyes of society. 
 Winnie is rooted to the spot not just literally but figuratively, as she is ensnared in the 
cultural, gendered script that has promised her happiness in the shape of marriage, that primary 
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words and directions foisted upon her in the shape of a theatrical script, written by a man who 
works from the gender narratives handed down to him from less molecular times. Beauvoir writes 
of how marriage so often “fails to assure woman the promised happiness” as it “mutilates her” and 
“dooms her to repetition and routine” (1997, p. 496). Woman is man’s commodity, his anchorage 
to immanence; through her he is assured the maintenance and progression of his tribe, the 
guardianship of the objects and status symbols that he has amassed and, in return, he assimilates 
her otherness into the order of his oneness, so that she may, vicariously, enjoy a position in the 
bosom of civility. Woman pays a high price for her most respected role in society, namely that of 
wife, as Beauvoir reminds us: “It has been said that Marriage diminishes man, which is often true; 
but it almost always annihilates woman” (p. 496). Beauvoir herself, whilst not married to Sartre, 
suffered professionally from her lifelong partnership with him, as her work, her achievements, her 
contributions to the field of existential phenomenology are so often assimilated into, overshadowed 
and “subsumed” (Simons, 2004, p. 2) by, those of her “more famous”, but above all male, partner. 
 Shari Benstock suggests that Winnie might rewrite the patriarchal script that would see her 
subsumed by her husband, if we consider the possibility that “Willie exists because Winnie claims 
he exists; he exists because she directs her words to him” (1992, p. 179). We do see and hear Willie 
occasionally ourselves, however, he is not solely narration, and I would argue that he fulfills the 
role of the absent male who rarely appears in the domestic sphere but is nonetheless its constant 
centre of reference. The presence of the male in Winnie’s realm is an absent presence, more 
narrated than actualised, but all-consuming; Winnie refers to Willie constantly, and describes his 
movements and actions, and he only appears, “pops up”, now and then, to assert his freedom and 
authority. Benstock raises an important point when she writes that: “In a reversal of traditional 
roles, it is woman here who asks the overwhelming philosophic questions, but she poses them in 
traditionally ‘female’ terms, in the language of the domestic” (p. 176). Winnie’s potential 
transcendence is always mired in the immanent, in the Shower and the Cooker, the child and the 
marriage, whereas Willie brings to the stage evidence of his transcendent contact with the outside 
world and world affairs in the shape of a newspaper, from which he reads the headlines to her 
(Beckett, 2006, p. 142). Willie is the authority in the marriage, and he educates his grounded, 
goodly wife, just as Beauvoir’s provider feels superior upon returning home to his woman after a 
day of work with his equals and betters: “He relates the events of the day, explains how right he 
has been in arguments with opponents, happy to find in his wife a double who bolsters his self-
confidence; he comments on the papers and political news, he willingly reads aloud to her so that 
even her contact with culture may not be independent” (1997, p. 483). Benstock further argues that 
gender roles are transformed in this play, as what would, traditionally, be “Winnie’s position of 
waiting, attending, crawling at the margins of the central, imbedded truth is transferred to Willie” 
(1992, p. 180). Willie is not “hanging” on Winnie’s words, however, he has become immune to 
them; Winnie repeatedly pleads for his attention, which he very rarely gives to her, and makes 
excuses for her “poor dear Willie” (Beckett, 2006, p. 139), authorising his neglect of her. Willie 
listens and speaks to Winnie as and when he condescends to, and Winnie seeks his constant 
reassurance and approval, gratefully receiving what titbits he throws at her, and using them as fuel 
to prolong her journey alongside him. Winnie hangs on to her marriage, to the script, protesting 
her happiness, whether through habit, a sense of duty or true desire, and she asks her husband if 
he does the same, as she senses that gravity is losing its once unquestionable power on them both: 
“Don’t you have to cling on sometimes, Willie?” (p. 152). Whether Winnie’s marriage has failed 
to deliver or not, each day will be a “happy day” for her, lest she should find herself devoid of 
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 For Winnie, spokesperson for her era, to become a woman is to forgo autonomous 
transcendence and to become fully absorbed into the cultural script: to be assimilated into the earth, 
into immanence, into her husband, and to be annihilated. Young writes that, whilst we are 
subjective beings by our very nature, there is a “tension between transcendence and immanence” 
which informs femininity: “While feminine bodily existence is a transcendence and openness to 
the world, it is an ambiguous transcendence, a transcendence that is at the same time laden with 
immanence” (2005, p. 36). As we have seen, Winnie’s transcendence is “overlaid with 
immanence” (Young, 2005, p. 36) as her conjugal responsibilities consume her freedom. 
Ultimately, Winnie is smothered, as immanence envelops and absorbs her entirely. Perhaps Willie 
seeks to end his anchorage to this immanence, to the situation created by his wife, as “vagabond” 
husbands and children according to Beauvoir (1997, p. 475) do, when, at the close of the play he 
“emerges completely” (Beckett, 2006, p. 166) and we realise that he, unlike Winnie, has been free 
to leave his hole all along. Up until this point, we have only seen parts of Willie’s body, the back 
of his head as he read the newspaper, or a functional arm, but as the “action” draws to a close he 
reveals himself, albeit with some difficulty; he, too, has been firmly embedded in his designated, 
gendered cultural role. Even at this, the bitter end, Winnie is unsure whether Willie is reaching 
towards her out of affection, or for some other, more pressing reason. Whilst she hopes that her 
husband is finally going to join her in the nest that she has made, Winnie must ask: “Is it me you’re 
after, Willie . . . or is it something else?” (p. 167). When Willie climbs out from behind his mound 
it becomes clear that he, unlike Winnie, is free to end his suffering on his own terms; whether he 
is reaching towards his wife to kiss her, or reaching towards a more definitive ending to joint 
sufferings, namely the auspicious revolver which has remained in Winnie’s sight throughout Act 
Two, is unclear, but we are left with no doubt that a woman has been made one with the earth, 
rendered entirely immobile and powerless, her uncertain fate to be decided, after the final curtain, 
by her male keeper. 
 Whilst Bryden recognises the “essentialist and often deeply misogynistic construction of 
Woman” (1993, p. 7) in Beckett’s early prose, she seeks to gradually erode the existential issue of 
gender in his works, and even suggests that gender studies serve to reinforce “the iron mould of 
patriarchy” (p. 119), promoting “molarity” (rigidly structured and fixed ideals/essences/poles) in 
our identification of female stereotypes. I would argue, however, that Bryden avoids a study of 
Beckett’s women where she claims to be launching one, (perhaps in an attempt to cleanse the 
writer of his early misogyny), by suggesting that a Deleuzian neutralisation of gender polarities 
can be read in the evolution of his work, particularly where he turns his attention to writing for the 
theatre. Bryden understandably examines Beckett’s female characters according to the phases of 
his work that they occupy: early prose, where female biology is depicted much more aggressively 
and women are portrayed as corporeal succubi, and then later drama and prose where men and 
women appear to have been released from a preoccupation with carnal urges, sometimes by virtue 
of age and decrepitude, or by a detachment from concrete reality Bryden devotes a chapter to “The 
Mother”, that Beckettian archetype par excellence, but her primary concern is with arguing that 
Beckett is engaged in a progressive “experimentation in the area of gender molecularity” (p. 118). 
Characters, male and female, all “evolve” in a certain sense, throughout the Beckett canon, as 
identities become ethereal and fluid, and boundaries between presence and absence, subjectivity 
and objectivity, self and other, blur. All characters, however (unless otherwise stated, as in late 
stage work Quad), are given a sex by Beckett, and gender is essential to understanding something 
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ceases to align so readily with that of the mind/body as we approach Beckett’s later works,7 simply 
too much of the female stereotype/archetype remains, right up until the end, for me to admit of a 
“gender molecularity” anywhere in the canon. Winnie, in particular, is so rooted to her 
sociohistorical situation that it is remarkable that she has not been analysed as exemplary of 
Beauvoir’s Woman prior to this work.   
 I do not wish to reinforce gender molarities in my reading of Beckett’s Happy Days but, 
rather, recognise that sexual difference is integral to an understanding of the characters therein, as: 
“Man and woman are irreducible the one to the other: they cannot be substituted the one for the 
other, not because of a quantity . . . but because of a difference in being and existing, that is to say 
a qualitative difference” (Irigaray, 2008, p. 75). Bryden, in her seeming eradication of gender in 
her analysis of Beckett’s work, flattens the surface rather too eagerly, perhaps by way of attempting 
to liberate the writer from his earlier misogyny by liberating his later characters from their 
gendered identities. Deleuze writes that: “It is . . . indispensable for women to conduct a molar 
politics”, however he adds that, “it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a [molar] subject, which 
does not function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow” (2013, 321). A middle way is 
needed then, between declaiming gender stereotypes too readily and trying to prove gender 
indeterminacy in Beckett’s work, and this essay has attempted to encapsulate something that could 
be used as a springboard towards much more detailed work on gender in Beckett and, indeed, on 
Beauvoir as a phenomenologist who has much to offer to Beckett scholarship. In a 
phenomenological study of Beckett’s oeuvre, like the thesis that this paper is extracted from 
(Hennessy, 2015), it seems to me that to omit a consideration of the ways in which gender, a lens 
through which our position in the world is viewed, shapes the human experience would be to tell 
only half of the already untellable story, and to attempt to swerve issues of gender amounts to yet 
another assimilation of Woman by man. 
 
  
                                                          
7 Rockaby was written in 1980, when Beckett was in his seventies, and features “W”, his last female stage 
protagonist. W has much in common with the female protagonist of prose work Ill Seen Ill Said (1981), an isolated 
old woman, who approaches death and fixates on mortality as she ventures out of her cabin only to make 
pilgrimages to a nearby tomb. These decaying women, shrivelled, androgynous carcasses of the fleshly, sexually-
aggressive females of Beckett’s early prose writing, have their male counterparts in the white-haired male 
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